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This paper combines matching frictions with e¢ ciency wages to deter shirking in a model
that is estimated for the USA and the UK to derive the underlying structural parameters.
Methods robust to weak instruments are used to show that, for both countries, both
matching frictions and e¢ ciency wages play a signi￿cant role in enabling the model to
￿t the data even with non-prescriptive formulations for wage determination. The results
indicate that adding an e¢ ciency wage element to matching frictions may be a better
way to ￿t the data than simply searching for an alternative wage formulation.
Keywords: Matching frictions, e¢ ciency wages, unemployment, shirking, robust in-
ference
JEL classi￿cation: E2, J3, J61 Introduction
Two theoretical approaches used widely in discussions of unemployment are models of
matching frictions, stemming from the work of Diamond (1982), Blanchard and Diamond
(1989), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (1985), and shirking models of
e¢ ciency wages based on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). A number of contributions have cal-
ibrated or estimated tightly-speci￿ed aggregate formulations of the Mortensen-Pissarides
matching model ￿ for recent examples, see Cole and Rogerson (1999), Yashiv (2000),
Hall (2005a), Shimer (2005) and Yashiv (2006).1 These, however, typically ￿nd it hard to
match aspects of the US data, at least with wage determination based on the widely-used
standard Nash bargain, and this has generated the search for alternative wage determi-
nation procedures, see Hall (2005b) and Hall and Milgrom (2007).
This paper explores a di⁄erent approach, asking whether it is more consistent with
the data to add an e¢ ciency wage element to matching frictions, a natural step since the
two approaches are complements, not substitutes. It does this by constructing a model
that combines matching frictions with a tightly-speci￿ed shirking model of e¢ ciency
wages based on the extension of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in MacLeod and Malcomson
(1998) for which model parameters can be estimated empirically. The paper estimates
the combined model econometrically for the US and the UK. To address the concern in
the earlier literature (see, for example, Bean (1994)) about the identi￿cation of aggregate
time-series econometric models of this type (and particularly their wage equations), the
paper uses empirical methods that are robust to weak identi￿cation. Speci￿cally, it uses a
novel method to construct con￿dence sets for inference purposes that are robust to weak
instruments. The bottom line is that the data for both countries call for the inclusion of
an e¢ ciency wage element in the model in addition to matching frictions, even for non-
prescriptive formulations of wage determination. This suggests that adding e¢ ciency
wages to matching frictions may be a better way to ￿t the data than simply searching
for an alternative wage formulation. The paper also provides an indication of the relative
contributions of matching frictions and e¢ ciency wages to long-run unemployment.
The model of matching frictions and vacancy creation used here is essentially an
econometric speci￿cation of that in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) applied recently to
US data by Hall (2005b) and Shimer (2005). The model of e¢ ciency wages is essentially
that of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) as extended in MacLeod and Malcomson (1998). In
addition to incorporating both frictional and e¢ ciency wage unemployment, the model
incorporates a further type of unemployment that can arise for the following reason.
To sustain the e¢ ciency wage equilibrium in the model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
requires, as pointed out by Carmichael (1985), a mechanism to prevent wages from being
bid down. That workers will shirk if it is in their interest to do so is not in itself su¢ cient
for this because it is wages in the future that in￿ uence the incentives to shirk. Thus, when
hiring an employee, a ￿rm can reduce the starting wage to the point at which the employee
is indi⁄erent between taking the job and not taking the job without a⁄ecting incentives
to shirk. But, if ￿rms can do that, it becomes in each ￿rm￿ s interest to replace its current
employees with new ones to take advantage of the low starting wage. Then employees
have no incentive not to shirk because they will never receive the higher future wages
required to deter shirking. Firms, anticipating this, will not hire them in the ￿rst place,
1There is also a growing literature applying disaggregated versions of the matching model with het-






























































Figure 1: (a) Shapiro-Stiglitz model (b) Model with matching frictions
so no employment occurs. Thus, as MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) show, the e¢ ciency
wage equilibrium cannot be sustained. MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) also show that
an equilibrium with employment can be sustained by a market convention about the
wage that is appropriate for the job. Firms adhere to the convention because employees
either shirk or refuse a job if they do not. Employees adhere to the convention because
￿rms either do not hire them or else ￿re them if they do not. Thus it is in both sides￿
interests to stick to the convention. Such a convention provides the mechanism necessary
to prevent the bidding down of wages that destroys equilibrium with employment.
Conventions of this sort are not, however, restricted to sustaining the e¢ ciency wage
equilibrium of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). They can support any wage high enough to
deter shirking and low enough to enable ￿rms to make pro￿ts, as MacLeod and Malcomson
(1998) show. The implications for the model in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) are illustrated
in Figure 1(a). On the vertical axis is the wage w as a share of worker productivity p,
on the horizontal axis the ratio of ￿lled jobs to workers j. For j = 1, all workers are
employed, so 1 ￿ j corresponds to the unemployment rate. The upward sloping curve
labelled NSC is the Shapiro-Stiglitz no-shirking condition, which gives the lowest wage
that deters shirking for a given unemployment rate. It is upward sloping in employment
because a higher wage is required to prevent shirking when unemployment is lower. The
downward sloping line labelled Ld is the labour demand, or job creation, curve specifying
the maximum number of pro￿table jobs that can exist at a given wage. The appropriate
market convention can sustain the Shapiro-Stiglitz equilibrium at the intersection of the
two curves, point A in Figure 1(a). But other market conventions can sustain as equilibria
any higher wage such as w￿ (with the corresponding employment rate given by the labour
demand curve at U￿) up to the level at which the labour demand curve cuts the vertical
axis. Bargaining power of matched workers or trade unions may also raise wages above the
minimum level required to prevent shirking but are not necessary for that. Whatever the
reason for a wage above that corresponding to point A, it results in higher unemployment.
We refer to such unemployment as high wage unemployment.
2It is straightforward to add matching frictions to this framework. Such frictions reduce
the pro￿tability of creating a new job because that job may not be ￿lled straightaway.
They reduce pro￿tability more as the ratio of jobs to workers increases, so the job creation
curve becomes steeper. Moreover, some jobs remain vacant while ￿nding a match so the
number of ￿lled jobs is less than the total number; the horizontal distance between the
￿lled jobs and the job creation lines in Figure 1(b) corresponds to the number of jobs
created at a given wage that remain vacant, determined as standard in the literature by
a matching function. The number of such vacancies increases as the unemployment rate
is reduced because there are fewer unemployed workers with which to match, so the ￿lled
jobs line is steeper than the job creation line. But matching frictions leave the no-shirking
condition unchanged. The resulting curves are all illustrated in Figure 1(b). With these
changes taken into account, the underlying analysis of high wage unemployment remains
largely unchanged. For a wage convention that sets the wage at w￿ in Figure 1(b), jobs
are created to the level on the job creation curve corresponding to that wage (point C)
and the number of ￿lled jobs is at the point on the ￿lled jobs curve corresponding to that
wage (point B). The equilibrium unemployment rate is thus U.
Which of the multiple equilibria comes about depends on the convention that deter-
mines the wage. That is something external to the model. For empirical purposes, a
natural way to specify it is via a wage equation ￿ the convention in the model deter-
mines what the wage will be as a function of economic conditions which is exactly what a
wage equation does. In e⁄ect, the wage equation acts as an equilibrium selection device,
as in Hall (2005b). It can also take account of wages that are above the minimum level
necessary to deter shirking because of trade union or insider bargaining power. When
estimated along with the matching function and a dynamic version of the labour demand
curve, it can be used to determine all the parameters of the model.
The extent to which unemployment results from matching frictions, e¢ ciency wages
and high wages, respectively can be measured in the way illustrated in Figure 1(b). Sup-
pose the wage share derived from the wage equation is given by the curve ws. The
long-run equilibrium wage selected by this curve is w￿ with employment at B, the corre-
sponding point on the ￿lled jobs curve. The long-run unemployment rate is then given by
U. Removing all matching frictions with everything else unchanged shifts the long-run
equilibrium from point B to point F on the job creation curve with no frictions, so a
measure of unemployment arising from matching frictions is given by Uf. Removing high
wages (that is, reducing wages to the lowest level consistent with deterring shirking) cor-
responds to making the wage curve identical to the no-shirking condition, as in Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984). Starting from point F with no matching frictions, that shifts the
long-run equilibrium to point A, so a measure of unemployment arising from high wages
is given by Uhw. At point A, there remains just e¢ ciency wage unemployment Ueff. (An
alternative measure of unemployment arising from high wages is the shift from B to E,
and of that arising from matching frictions the shift from E to A, but in our calculations
the di⁄erences turn out to be negligible.)
Figure 1 illustrates only long-run equilibria. For estimation, the speci￿cations of the
job creation equation, the no-shirking condition and the wage equation are explicitly dy-
namic. The ￿rst of these is speci￿ed by the condition that the expected cost of creating
an additional vacancy equals the expected future pro￿t from having an additional job
to ￿ll, taking account of the probability of ￿lling it. Similarly the no-shirking condition
recognizes that the incentive to provide e⁄ort depends on the path of future wages and
the probability of obtaining an alternative job. The ￿nal equation in the model is the
3matching function. The economic speci￿cations of the wage and job creation equations
correspond directly to moment conditions, so a natural estimation procedure is the Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM) initiated by Hansen (1982). Because of the concern
with identi￿cation in models of this kind, we construct con￿dence sets for the long-run
values of interest (the long-run unemployment rate and its various decompositions) using
methods described in Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) that are robust to weak identi-
￿cation. As shown by Kleibergen and Mavroeidis (2007), these methods yield reliable
inference without requiring any identi￿cation assumptions.
The model is estimated on data for the USA and the UK. For both countries we ￿nd
that the data call for both matching frictions and e¢ ciency wages ￿ the parameters of the
matching function are such as to enable us to reject the hypothesis that all vacancies are
matched straightaway at the 0.1% level and the no-shirking condition is signi￿cantly above
the workers￿reservation wage. However, the relative contributions of matching frictions
and e¢ ciency wages to unemployment di⁄ers substantially between the two countries. For
the US, of the long-run unemployment rate estimated at 5.9%, matching frictions account
for 1.7%, high wages for 0.7%, and e¢ ciency wages for 3.5%. For the UK, the long-run
unemployment rate is estimated at 6.1%. But there, matching frictions account for only
0.1% (though still signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero), high wages for another 0.2%, and
e¢ ciency wages for 5.8%. In the estimation, we allow for considerable ￿ exibility in the
wage equation and, while the point estimates naturally di⁄er for di⁄erent speci￿cations,
the basic conclusion that matching frictions do not account for all long-run unemployment
is highly robust. Even with wage determination not restricted to the standard Nash
bargain, the model needs more than just matching frictions to match the data well.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model and character-
izes equilibrium. The following section provides details of the empirical implementation
and the estimation procedure. This is followed by a description and discussion of the
estimation results. Section 5 applies robust inference procedures to investigate long-run
unemployment and its components. That is followed by a short conclusion.
2 Theory
2.1 The model
The model consists of risk-neutral workers and ￿rms with a common discount factor ￿t
at time t. A job may have one worker working a speci￿ed number of hours or no worker
at all. A worker￿ s utility in period t from being employed at total cost to the ￿rm wt and
incurring e⁄ort et is wt￿t ￿ ctet, where ￿t is the ratio of take-home pay to the total cost
of employment to the ￿rm and ct is the time-dependent disutility of e⁄ort measured in
monetary terms. E⁄ort takes one of two values, et = 1 (working) and et = 0 (shirking).
The output received by the ￿rm is ptet, so its period t pro￿t from employing a worker is
ptet ￿ wt. Monitoring by the ￿rm is perfect but not veri￿able in court, so a ￿rm knows
a worker￿ s e⁄ort in its job but cannot make the wage conditional on that. As in Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) it can, however, ￿re an employee who shirks.2
The timing of events is shown in Figure 2. At the start of period t, the economy is
characterized by the following stocks determined at t ￿ 1: Jt￿1 ￿lled jobs and employed
2Formally, pt is the total productivity (net of non-labour costs) of employing a worker in period t for
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Figure 2: Timing of events in period t
workers; Vt￿1 vacancies un￿lled after matches in period t￿1 have been formed; and Lt￿1
workers, of whom Lt￿1 ￿Jt￿1 are unemployed. At t0, four exogenous events occur. First,
a common productivity pt for all jobs producing in period t is observed. Second, the
discount factor ￿t for receipts and payments at t+1 is observed. Third, a fraction 1￿￿t
of the jobs ￿lled in period t ￿ 1, and of un￿lled vacancies at t ￿ 1, become unpro￿table
for exogenous reasons and are destroyed. Fourth, vacancies that ￿rms decided at t ￿ n
(with n ￿ 1 given exogenously) to create for period t become available to be ￿lled. Once
vacancy creation has taken place, the stock of vacancies becomes ￿tVt￿1 +V c
t . To keep a
vacancy available for ￿lling, a ￿rm must incur a hiring cost  t each period. Creating an
additional vacancy incurs a capital cost that, discounted back to t￿n (when the decision
to create the vacancy is made), is denoted ￿t￿n. Thus, as recommended by Shimer (2005)
for ￿tting US data, vacancies are a genuine state variable. The speci￿cations of  t and ￿t
are determined empirically. Finally at t0, labour supply increases exogenously by ￿Lt.
All these events are public information.
At t1, ￿rms with vacancies and unemployed workers create Mt new matches at agreed
wage wt and that wage is paid. Creating new matches requires search. The search friction
is characterized by a matching function for which an empirical functional form is speci￿ed
later. At t2, workers decide the e⁄ort et to incur and ￿rms decide how many vacancies to
create for period t + n. Finally in period t, at t3, ￿rms with workers observe output ptet
and decide whether to retain or ￿re their worker.
Employment in period t is the fraction of jobs in the previous period that are not
destroyed, ￿tJt￿1, plus newly matched vacancies Mt, so
Jt = ￿tJt￿1 + Mt: (1)
Let jt = Jt=Lt, mt = Mt=Lt and lt = Lt=Lt￿1. Then, divided by Lt, (1) becomes
jt = ￿tjt￿1=lt + mt: (2)
This, with a speci￿c functional form for the matching function, is one of the model
equations that is estimated. The stock of vacancies at the end of period t, Vt, is the sum
of vacancies at the outset of the period after destruction has taken place, ￿tVt￿1, and
newly created vacancies, V c
t , minus matches Mt, so
Vt = ￿tVt￿1 + V
c
t ￿ Mt: (3)
Let vc
t = V c
t =Lt denote the ratio of new vacancies to workers at t. In an equilibrium in
which no workers actually shirk, the ratio of total vacancies to workers at the time of
5matching at t1 is vt given by
vt =










the second equality following from manipulation of (3).3
Also in an equilibrium in which no workers actually shirk, the stock of unemployed
workers seeking matches at t1 consists of workers who were unemployed in the previous
period, Lt￿1￿Jt￿1, workers who were employed in the previous period but have lost their
job, (1 ￿ ￿t)Jt￿1, and new workers, ￿Lt = Lt ￿ Lt￿1, making Lt ￿ ￿tJt￿1 in total. Thus









Equilibrium requires that, as long as new vacancies are created, the expected pro￿t from
creating an additional vacancy is zero. Denote by ￿t the expected present value of current
and future pro￿ts at t1 from having a job ￿lled at wage cost wt. This equals output net of
wage costs at t, plus the expected present value of pro￿ts from period t+1 on, discounted
by the discount factor at t and the probability that the relationship is not ended before
production at t + 1 because the job is destroyed for exogenous reasons. Thus
￿t = pt ￿ wt + Et (￿t￿t+1￿t+1); for all t; (7)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available at t2. The
probability of ￿lling a vacancy at t is mt=vt. Hence, the present discounted value ￿ ￿t of
having a vacancy available for matching at t is













; for all t: (8)
The interpretation is as follows. The hiring cost  t is incurred to keep the vacancy
available for this period. With probability mt=vt, the vacancy is matched with a worker
and yields expected future pro￿t ￿t; with probability 1 ￿ mt=vt, it is not matched with
a worker and, if not destroyed for exogenous reasons, remains available to be ￿lled in
period t + 1. For an equilibrium in which (as in practice) vacancies are created in each
period, ￿rms decide at t￿n to create new vacancies vc
t that become available to be ￿lled








= 0; for all t; (9)
3From (4), ￿tVt￿1 + V c
t = vtLt which, used in (3), gives Vt = (vt ￿ mt)Lt. Substitution of this for
t ￿ 1 into (4) gives
vt =
￿t (vt￿1 ￿ mt￿1)Lt￿1 + V c
t
Lt








which corresponds to (5).
6where we use the convention that the expectation operator Et applied to a variable at
a date t + i with i ￿ 1 is taken over the joint distribution of the random variables at
t + 1;:::;t + i, and it is assumed that vacancies in the process of creation in period t
also become unpro￿table at the same rate (1 ￿ ￿t) as jobs already created and are thus
abandoned. (Alternative assumptions can be used.) Of course, if it were the case that
￿t < 0, existing jobs at t would all be closed down and no vacancies ￿lled, so there would
be no employment. A su¢ cient condition to ensure ￿t ￿ 0 is that ps ￿ ws ￿ 0 for all
s ￿ t, although it is clearly not necessary that this hold in every period.
Equation (9) is the basis of the job creation line in Figure 1. As it stands, it is
not suitable for empirical purposes because ￿ ￿t contains terms stretching into the in￿nite
future. Applied to t + n, however, (9) can be used to replace terms further in the future
than t+n￿1 by the cost of creating vacancies at t+n and t+n+1. The manipulations
required to do this are given in Appendix A, which shows that, with the convention Qj














































= Et￿n (zt;n); for all t; (10)









￿￿ ￿t+1￿t￿t+1 ￿ ￿t
￿￿
;
which depends on the covariance of the excess pro￿ts from having a job available to be
￿lled next period with the inverse of the probability of ￿lling that job in that period.
Under perfect foresight, Et￿nzt;n = 0 necessarily. For other cases, that can be tested, at
least in part, as a result of the over-identifying restrictions it implies.
Equation (10) is the job creation equation used for empirical analysis. Its interpreta-
tion is more straightforward when n = 1, so a vacancy becomes available to be ￿lled the































= Et￿1 (￿t￿1); for all t: (11)
The term on the right-hand side is the expected cost of creating a vacancy to become
available in period t, as measured at t￿1 when the decision to create the vacancy is made.
The left-hand side gives the expected bene￿t from creating that vacancy. Consider ￿rst
the ￿nal term in braces. The cost  t has to be incurred to keep the vacancy available at t.
With probability 1￿mt=vt the vacancy will not be ￿lled in period t, when it ￿rst becomes
available. In that case, the expected future pro￿ts from having created the vacancy are
7just the same as if the vacancy had been created one period later, discounted by the factor
￿t￿1￿t to allow for the costs having been incurred one period earlier and for the probability
that there is one additional period for the vacancy to become unpro￿table for exogenous
reasons. By the equilibrium condition for vacancies that become available to ￿ll in t+1,
those expected future pro￿ts equal the expected cost of creating a vacancy for that period,
Et (￿t). Now consider the ￿rst term in braces. With probability mt=vt, the vacancy will
be ￿lled in period t. The terms multiplying that correspond to the expected future pro￿ts
from ￿lling it. These consist of the expected pro￿ts in period t itself, pt ￿ wt, plus the
expected future pro￿ts from t+1 on. These latter are the same as for a vacancy created
one period later that becomes available for ￿lling at t + 1 and is ￿lled immediately. By
the equilibrium condition for vacancies that become available at t+1, these consist of the
di⁄erence between the expected cost of creating the vacancy, Et (￿t), and the expected
pro￿ts if it is not ￿lled, adjusted by the appropriate probabilities. The expected pro￿ts
if it is not ￿lled are, in turn, the same as those of having a vacancy become available
one period later at t + 2 which, by the equilibrium condition for vacancy creation for
t + 2, equals the expected cost of creation Et+1 (￿t+1) discounted appropriately. The
di⁄erence between (10) for n > 1 and (11) is that, to get the appropriate discount factors
in the former, we have used the equilibrium condition for creating a vacancy n periods
ahead, so we have also to add the series of appropriately discounted one-period pro￿ts
pt+j ￿wt+j from t+1 to t+n￿1. Note that there is nothing here speci￿c to an e¢ ciency
wage story. Essentially, (10) is a slightly generalized econometric speci￿cation of the
equilibrium condition in Hall (2005b) and Shimer (2005) that there are zero pro￿ts to
creating additional vacancies.
Equilibrium with employment requires workers not to shirk. For a worker in a match
in period t, the expected present value Wt of deciding at t2 not to shirk and staying with
the ￿rm consists of take-home pay less the disutility of e⁄ort in period t, wt￿t ￿ ct, plus
the expected future utility from not being dismissed for shirking. Thus,
Wt = wt￿t ￿ ct + ￿tEt
￿
￿t+1Wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1) ￿ Wt+1
￿
; for all t; (12)
where ￿ Wt+1 is the expected present value of starting period t + 1 unemployed, an event
that happens with the probability 1 ￿ ￿t+1 that the job comes to an end for exogenous
reasons. The probability that a worker unemployed at t0 ￿nds a job in the matching
process at t1 conditional on job seeking rate ut and matching rate mt is mt=ut. Hence,










bt + ￿tEt ￿ Wt+1
￿
; for all t; (13)
where bt is the utility received while unemployed in period t, including not only unem-
ployment bene￿ts but also utility (from, for example, home production) not obtained
from shirking while employed. The right-hand side of (13) can be interpreted as follows.
With probability mt=ut, the worker is hired at t and receives expected future utility Wt
from being matched. With probability 1￿mt=ut the worker is not hired at t and receives
utility of bt for period t plus the expected utility from starting period t + 1 unemployed.
A worker in a match in period t will shirk unless the expected future utility, Wt,
from not doing so is at least as great as that from shirking (with no disutility of e⁄ort),
collecting the wage wt in period t, but being ￿red and receiving the expected future
utility ￿tEt ￿ Wt+1 from starting period t + 1 unemployed. Thus a necessary condition for
the worker not to shirk, the no-shirking condition (NSC), is
8Wt ￿ wt￿t + ￿tEt ￿ Wt+1; for all t: (14)





Wt+1 ￿ ￿ Wt+1
￿￿
￿ ct; for all t: (15)
The economic interpretation is that, with no wage penalty in the current period from
shirking, the employee will shirk unless the discounted expected future gains to being em-
ployed over being unemployed, given that the employment will continue with probability
only ￿t+1 even if the worker does not shirk, exceeds the disutility of e⁄ort. (Separation
payments received by the worker can be thought of as increasing ct.) With the use of










































(wt+1￿t+1 ￿ ct+1 ￿ bt+1) + ￿t+1Et+1￿t+2
￿


















￿ ct; for all t: (17)
For the formulation used here, the results in MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) imply
that the no-shirking condition (15), and equivalently (17), is not only necessary for an
equilibrium in which workers do not shirk but, together with a condition that ￿rms make
non-negative pro￿ts that is certainly satis￿ed by (10), is also su¢ cient.4 Note that this
applies even if workers do not have conventional bargaining power as a result of matching
frictions or collective bargaining. (Worker bargaining power may, of course, also raise the
equilibrium wage above the no-shirking condition.) Because (17) is an inequality, (17)
and (10) do not determine unique equilibrium paths for wages and employment, merely
restrictions on the set of permissible equilibrium paths. For stationary equilibria, these
restrictions correspond to points in Figure 1 on the ￿lled jobs line and to the left of E.
2.3 Equilibrium selection
Any paths that satisfy the job creation equation (10) and the no-shirking condition (17)
are equilibrium paths with positive employment and some new vacancies created each
period. Which is selected, and thus gives rise to an actual history, depends on the
convention that determines the evolution of wages, see MacLeod and Malcomson (1998)
for the e¢ ciency wage model and Hall (2005b) for the matching model. Because the
4MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) show that there may (but need not) also exist equilibria with
bonus pay in which there is no e¢ ciency wage unemployment even with ct > 0. That, however, requires
vacancies to exceed unemployment su¢ ciently, which is not consistent with our data.
9convention is selecting among equilibria of the model, the model itself does not tell us more
than that the path it selects must satisfy the equilibrium conditions. We can ensure the
job creation equation is satis￿ed by representing the wage convention as the intersection
between a wage equation and the job creation equation, as in Figure 1. All we then have
to do is to ensure that the wage equation satis￿es the no-shirking condition (17) if there
are e¢ ciency wages. If there are no e¢ ciency wages, we need the wage equation to satisfy
properties that are appropriate for a model with just matching frictions. For the forward-
looking rational expectations model used here, it is natural for the wage equation also to
satisfy forward-looking rational expectations. This gives a clear identifying assumption
that enables us to use appropriately lagged values of variables as instruments.



















where ￿t = pt=pt￿1 and, to be consistent with our forward-looking speci￿cation, h(xt) is
a function of variables xt not known at t￿2. For the e¢ ciency wage context, appropriate
speci￿cation of h(xt) ensures that the wage at each date satis￿es the no-shirking condition
(17). Use equality in (15) to substitute for the terms in Wt+1 ￿ ￿ Wt+1 on the left-hand
























By construction, wt+1 is the lowest wage at t+1 that satis￿es (15) for t when it is satis￿ed
with equality for t + 1. Thus any wt+1 ￿ wt+1 satis￿es the no-shirking condition at t.




















To be consistent with the untrended unemployment rate in very long-run data, we assume
ct=pt has a constant long-run value c=p. But we do not wish to rule out completely short-
term changes in ct=pt, so we permit those that are iid deviations from the long-run value.
By taking expectations on both sides of (20) conditional on period t ￿ 2, we see that a




(1 + f (xt)); (21)
for f (xt) some non-negative function of variables xt not known at t￿2. This formulation
permits us to test whether the no-shirking condition binds at all t by testing whether
f (xt) = 0 for all t. Moreover, it can identify c=p and hence the location of the long-run
no-shirking condition. We discuss the full speci￿cation of f in Section 3.
The formulation in (18) also encompasses characteristics of wage determination in
labour markets without e¢ ciency wages. In a perfectly competitive labour market with
a given number of homogeneous workers, the labour supply curve has a reverse-L shape.
Thus, if there is unemployment (mt=ut < 1), the wage must be such that after-tax
10earnings ￿twt equal the utility bt received while unemployed. That is consistent with
(18) if, and only if, the square bracket is zero and h(xt) ￿ 0 for all t. If, however,
there is no unemployment, the utility received while unemployed plays no role in wage
determination ￿ the wage just has to satisfy the labour demand curve when all workers
are employed. That is consistent with (18) when h(xt) ￿ 0 for all t because, when there
is no unemployment, mt=ut = 1. The restriction h(xt) = 0 also corresponds to the search
model in Diamond (1971), for which the equilibrium wage converges to bt=￿t in the long
run as long as there are search frictions. With wage bargaining that arises from matching
frictions, after tax earnings may be above bt when mt=ut < 1, which is consistent with
(18) for h(xt) ￿ 0. But the wage converges to the competitive wage as matching frictions
go to zero, a property that should hold for any bargaining speci￿cation, not just the Nash
bargain traditionally used in matching models. That is consistent with (18) if, and only
if, the square bracket converges to zero and h(xt) ! 0 whenever mt=ut ! 1 or, more
generally, as matching frictions go to zero.
The wage equation (18) di⁄ers from the conventional log-linear speci￿cation that has
a long tradition in the literature, for example, Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (2005)
and Blanchard and Katz (1999). A conventional wage equation satis￿es the no-shirking
condition for su¢ ciently small disutility of e⁄ort ct as long as the wage goes to in￿nity as
unemployment goes to zero. But it can identify only an upper bound on ct=pt and, hence,
cannot determine the precise location of the no-shirking condition. Although theory does
not provide a natural identifying assumption for conventional wage equations, we estimate
the model using one as a robustness check on results that do not depend on the location
of the no-shirking condition. For appropriate selection of variables, this speci￿cation can
encompass the wage bargaining in such matching models as Blanchard and Diamond
(1989) and Pissarides (2000) and the wage curve of Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (1994). We
discuss the precise speci￿cation in Section 3.
3 Empirical implementation
The model consists of three equations: a matching equation, a job creation equation,
and a wage equation. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982)
is a natural estimation method for the job creation equation (10) and the wage equa-
tion (18) because their economic speci￿cations correspond to moment conditions. As
a system of equations, there are potential e¢ ciency gains to estimating the equations
jointly. Moreover, the hypotheses on long-run unemployment that we investigate imply
cross-equation parameter restrictions that can be tested most naturally using a system
approach. However, because the system is non-linear and there are a large number of
potentially relevant variables and their lags that we do not wish to exclude a priori, the
system approach is unwieldy ￿ the collinearity between potentially relevant variables
creates problems for convergence. So here we adopt the compromise of deriving a parsi-
monious speci￿cation that is satisfactory statistically by conducting preliminary analysis
on each of the equations in the model individually. We then estimate the parameters
of this parsimonious speci￿cation as a system (checking that the speci￿cation remains
statistically satisfactory) and use that for conducting inference.
As discussed later, each equation in the model can be estimated using conditional
moment restrictions of the form Es"i
t = 0; where "i
t denotes the residuals of equation i
and s < t. In particular, we show that s = t ￿ 1 for the matching and conventional
11wage equations, s = t ￿ 2 for the forward-looking rational expectations wage equation
(18), and choose n such that s = t ￿ n for the job-creation equation (10). This type
of moment condition implies EZi
s"i
t = 0 for any vector of instruments Zi
s that contains
variables known at time s: In other words, the set of admissible instruments for each
equation is in￿nite. It is well-known that use of many instruments can have adverse
e⁄ects on the ￿nite sample properties of GMM estimators and tests. In particular, use of
more instruments typically increases the ￿nite sample bias of the estimators, especially
if those additional instruments are poorly correlated with the endogenous variables they
are instrumenting, see Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002). Moreover, the power of the tests
of over-identifying restrictions deteriorates, making it harder to discover any model mis-
speci￿cation, see Mavroeidis (2005). We therefore assign a small number of instruments
Zi
t to each equation by including up to two lags of the variables that appear in that
particular equation.
Commonly, a two-step GMM estimator is used for computational convenience. Two-
step estimators are asymptotically e¢ cient. However, a number of studies have shown
that they have poor ￿nite-sample properties under weak or many instruments (for ex-
ample, su⁄er from large biases and size-distortions, see Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002)).
An alternative estimator proposed by Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996) is the Contin-
uously Updated GMM Estimator (CUE) de￿ned as the minimizer with respect to an
p-dimensional vector of parameters # of the objective function
S (#) = T
￿1fT (#)V
￿1
ff (#)fT (#); (22)
where T denotes the sample size, ft (#) is a k-dimensional moment function whose expec-
tation Eft (#) vanishes at the true value of the parameters, fT (#) =
PT
t=1 ft (#) are the





asymptotic variance matrix. We use the CUE because it has recently been shown to have
better ￿nite-sample properties than two-step estimators, see Newey and Smith (2004).
Moreover, the available test statistics that are robust to failure of the identi￿cation as-
sumption are based on the CUE objective function (22), see Stock and Wright (2000),
Kleibergen (2005) and Kleibergen and Mavroeidis (2007). Finally, to operationalize (22)
we use the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
(HAC) estimator of Vff (#); as suggested by Kleibergen (2005).
The concern about identi￿cation in aggregate time-series models of the type used here
makes it important to use inference procedures that are robust to weak instruments. Weak
identi￿cation implies that GMM estimators are inconsistent, that their distribution can
be very di⁄erent from the usual Normal approximation even in relatively large samples,
and that conventional standard errors may underestimate the true uncertainty in the
estimates. See, for example, Mavroeidis (2004). As a result, 95% con￿dence intervals
derived by inverting a Wald test, such as the usual two-standard-error band about a
point estimate, may be too narrow in the sense that the probability that they contain
the true value of the parameter can be much less than 95%. So for testing hypotheses
we employ, in addition to standard Wald tests, two further tests that are robust to weak
instruments. One is the test proposed by Stock and Wright (2000), which is based on
the fact that, under mild regularity conditions such as that fT (#) follows a central limit
theorem and that a consistent estimator of Vff (#) exists, the GMM objective function
(22) evaluated at the true value of # is asymptotically distributed as ￿2 with k degrees
of freedom, irrespective of whether # is identi￿ed or not. This test is a generalization of
a test that was originally proposed by Anderson and Rubin (1949) in the context of the
12linear instrumental variables regression model. We refer to it as the Anderson-Rubin-
Stock-Wright (ARSW) test.
One potential di¢ culty with the interpretation of the ARSW test stems from the fact
that it jointly tests the null hypothesis on the parameters of the model and the validity
of the over-identifying restrictions, see Stock and Wright (2000). Thus, the test statistic
may be large (and associated con￿dence sets may be tight) when the over-identifying
restrictions are violated. We address that problem by testing separately the validity of
the over-identifying restrictions using the Hansen (1982) test which, when computed using
the CUE, is robust to weak identi￿cation, see Kleibergen and Mavroeidis (2007). Another
weakness of the ARSW test is its lack of power when the model is heavily over-identi￿ed,
which reinforces the case for using a small number of instruments.
The second identi￿cation-robust test we use is that proposed by Kleibergen (2005).
Kleibergen derives a particular orthogonal decomposition of the ARSW statistic that
overcomes the aforementioned weaknesses of the ARSW test. Kleibergen shows that the
ARSW statistic S (#) can be decomposed into two asymptotically orthogonal compo-
nents called KLM (#) and JKLM (#). The former is a quadratic form involving the
derivative of S (#) with respect to # which, in large samples, has a ￿2 distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters. A test based on that statistic
is a particular type of Lagrange multiplier test, so we refer to it as the KLM test. The
statistic JKLM (#) = S (#) ￿ KLM (#) is interpretable as a test of the over-identifying
restrictions at the point #: See Appendix B for formal de￿nitions and further details on
the estimation methods.
3.1 Data
The data we use and the construction of variables are described in Appendix C. Here we
provide a brief summary and discuss some of the more important issues.
Wherever possible, we have used standard time-series data available from the OECD.
Employment and unemployment are the quarterly averages of the monthly series reported
in OECD Economic Indicators, the former measured in heads (not hours). Labour force
is measured as the sum of unemployment and employment. Productivity and wages are
constructed from National Accounts data. Productivity is measured by GDP in ￿xed
prices divided by employment in heads, and wages by compensation of all employees in
￿xed prices, gross of employment-related taxes imposed on both employers and employees,
divided by employment in heads. The tax measures are calculated from OECD National
Accounts. The sample covers the last four decades for the US and last two decades for





where rt as the annualised gross real interest rate.
Data for vacancy stocks and ￿ ows, where available, are obtained directly from national
sources. At the level of aggregation of this model, there are no data series equivalent to
￿t. A series that accords with the de￿nitions in the model can be calculated from data
on vacancy stocks and ￿ ows by combining (1) and (3):
￿t = (Jt + Vt ￿ V
c
t )=(Jt￿1 + Vt￿1): (24)
That is what we have used for the UK. For the US, no vacancy ￿ ow data is available.
Separations data that can be used to construct a series for job destruction (1￿￿t) directly
13is available from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) but only from
December 2000. So we adopted the time-honoured practice discussed by Blanchard and
Diamond (1990) of constructing a series for job destructions from the number of short-
term unemployed, in our case (because we are using quarterly data) those with spells
shorter than 14 weeks. Moreover, if the increase in the labour force all goes through the
unemployment pool ￿rst, then this increase should be subtracted from the short-term
unemployed before calculating the job destruction rate. We adjusted the data for this,
though the e⁄ect on the calculated ￿t is very small. We also made an adjustment for
direct job-to-job ￿ ows using the procedure suggested in Shimer (2005) based on the idea
that, on average, a worker losing a job has half a period to ￿nd a new one before being
recorded as unemployed. In our notation, the formula is
￿t =








Use of (2) and (6) respectively to substitute for mt and ut in this enables us to solve
for a series for ￿t that is consistent with the model.5 We scaled the resulting series to
the mean level of matches in the JOLTS data over the period for which that is available.
With data on ￿t, a series for V c
t can be constructed from (24) as
V
c
t = Vt + Jt ￿ ￿t (Vt￿1 + Jt￿1):
3.2 Matching function
It is conventional to estimate matching functions as a relationship between matches,
vacancies and unemployment. To reproduce the untrended unemployment rate in very
long-run data, we impose constant returns to long-run changes in the labour force by
estimating the relationship in terms of per capita rates. Consistent with the theory are
our measures of the vacancy rate vt and the job-seeking rate ut because these correspond
to the numbers seeking matches at the time matching takes place. For the form of the
function, we adopt the Cobb-Douglas formulation used widely in the literature. There
is, however, considerable empirical evidence of serial correlation with that formulation,
see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). So, to avoid mis-speci￿cation of the short-run
dynamics biasing our estimates, we use a partial adjustment model to account for those
dynamics. Thus, the empirical version of the matching function takes the form
lnmt = ￿m lnmt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿m)(ln￿0 + ￿1 lnvt + ￿2 lnut) + SRD + "
m
t ;
0 ￿ ￿0;￿1;￿2 ￿ 1; (25)
where "m
t is a structural shock that satis￿es Et￿1"m
t = 0 and SRD denotes additional
terms needed to account for short-run dynamics, determined empirically so that the
disturbance "m
t is serially uncorrelated. While ensuring constant returns to long-run
changes in the labour force, this formulation has constant returns to proportional changes
in ut and vt only if ￿1 + ￿2 = 1. Our preliminary single-equation estimation indicates
that SRD should include ￿lnut￿1 for the UK, and both ￿lnvt and ￿lnut (but with
5Even with the adjustment suggested by Shimer (2005), the measure of separations does not include
workers moving directly from jobs to self-employment or leaving the labour force but it is not clear how
to allow for that.
14coe¢ cients that sum to one) for the US. For later convenience, we de￿ne the parameter
vector ￿ = (￿0;￿1;￿2). The assumption Et￿1"m
t = 0 implies that we can estimate ￿,
￿m and the coe¢ cient ￿￿lnu in SRD by GMM using lags of lnmt;lnvt and lnut as
instruments.
3.3 Job creation equation
The second equation to be estimated empirically is the job creation equation (10). For
empirical purposes it is convenient to scale (10) by pt￿n and to de￿ne the new variables




e ￿t+i = e ￿t+1 :::e ￿t+j, for j ￿ 1; and e ￿t;0 = 1;
where ￿t = pt=pt￿1, as before. The variable e ￿t is a one-period-ahead e⁄ective discount
factor, while e ￿t;j is a j-period ahead e⁄ective discount factor, in both cases allowing for
the probability of job destruction and productivity growth. Since we have no data for the
term appearing on the right-hand side of equation (10), we make the over-identifying as-
sumption (which we test) that its conditional expectation is zero, and derive the following


















































= 0, for all t: (26)
To estimate this equation we need to model the cost of creating vacancies ￿t and the
hiring cost  t. For an untrended long-run unemployment rate, the costs ￿t and  t must
trend with productivity so that ￿t=pt and  t=pt are stationary. The cost ￿t￿n of creating
a vacancy ready to be ￿lled at time t may be incurred at any time from t ￿ n (when
the decision to create it is made) to t. We allow this cost to depend on the number of
vacancies created at any time during period t ￿ n to t, perhaps because of externalities
















Because the coe¢ cients ￿1;j, j = 1;:::;n are not, in fact, signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero









e ￿t￿n;j￿0 + ￿1v
c
t￿n: (28)
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t = 0; for all t: (30)
For convenience, we refer to the parameters of this equation by the vector ￿ = (￿0;￿1;￿h).
Despite its complicated appearance, (30) is linear in the parameters ￿ for given n;
and can be estimated by linear GMM using variables known at date t￿n as instruments.
Note that the error process "
jc
t is not a mean innovation process and, in particular, it may
exhibit serial correlation up to order 2n ￿ 1 without invalidating the model. There are
no theoretical arguments for any particular choice of n. Since for any choice of n we lose
2n observations from the sample, we set n as the smallest value for which the moment
conditions Et￿n"
jc
t = 0 are satis￿ed and the residuals do not exhibit autocorrelation
beyond lag 2n ￿ 1. Our preliminary single-equation estimation indicates that n = 2 for
the UK and n = 3 for the US.
For the UK, the coe¢ cients ￿0 and ￿1 in the job creation cost are signi￿cant. The
coe¢ cient of hiring costs ￿h is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, so we impose that
restriction on the model. For the US, the results are the opposite, namely ￿h is highly
signi￿cant, while ￿0 and ￿1 are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. (In fact, the point
estimate for those parameters is slightly negative). Hence, we impose the restriction that
job creation costs in the US are zero. The validity of those restrictions is tested using
both Wald and identi￿cation-robust tests, see Table 6 in Appendix D.
We also tested the assumption that the right-hand side of (10) is zero using the Hansen
test of over-identifying restrictions and found no evidence against its validity. The model
predicts that the residuals "
jc
t should not exhibit serial correlation beyond lag 2n. We
tested this implication using the test proposed by Cumby and Huizinga (1992) and found
no evidence against the null of no excess serial correlation (see Table 6 in Appendix D).
3.4 Forward-looking rational expectations wage equation
Our primary wage equation is the forward-looking rational expectations (FLRE) wage
equation (18). We start by using this to test whether wage determination is consistent
with bargaining when matching frictions are the sole source of unemployment, with no
e¢ ciency wages. That, as explained in Section 2.3, requires h(xt) ! 0 as mt=ut ! 1, a









where zt is a vector of variables that are not known at time t￿2 in accordance with our
forward-looking rational expectations identi￿cation restriction. A necessary condition for
16h(xt) ! 0 as mt=ut ! 1 is then h1 (1) = 0 and ￿z = 0. The simplest test of that
hypothesis is to specify h1 (mt=ut) = ￿m ln(mt=ut) and include only a constant in zt. For
robustness, we considered alternative parametrizations of h1 (mt=ut) with the property
that h1 (1) = 0: To capture potential non-linearity in h1, we considered polynomials in
ln(mt=ut) and (mt=ut ￿ 1). We also tried replacing mt=ut by vt=ut, a measure of labour
market tightness widely used in bargaining models with matching frictions, which also
goes to one as matching frictions go to zero. In every case, the restriction ￿z = 0 was
resoundingly rejected by all tests (at signi￿cance level less than 0.1%). This also rules
out the hypothesis that the labour market is perfectly competitive because that requires
h(xt) ￿ 0 for all t, as explained in Section 2.3.
In view of this result, we turn to the speci￿cation of h(xt) in (21) that combines
matching frictions with e¢ ciency wages. To model f (xt) in (21), we use a parametric
function of relevant variables xt that satis￿es the necessary non-negativity constraint
f (xt) = exp(￿
0xt): (32)
With this speci￿cation of f, (18) can be estimated by GMM using variables known at
time t ￿ 2 as instruments.6
The parameter vector ￿ is not identi￿ed separately from c=p in (18) if xt contains only
a constant but it is straightforward to test whether this identi￿cation problem arises. The
null hypothesis can be formulated as f (xt) ￿ 0 in (21) and tested using the Hansen test
of over-identifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis, the model reduces to a linear
regression of














on a constant and implies that any variable known at t ￿ 2 must be uncorrelated with
Yt. A test of over-identifying restrictions in this case is simply an F-test of exclusion
restrictions for any set of variables known at time t ￿ 2. This test rejects very strongly
(at signi￿cance levels less than 0.1%) even when only Yt￿2 is used as an instrument. An
additional implication of this test is that the no-shirking condition cannot bind at all
t because a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for this is that f (xt) is constant, a
rejection of the basic e¢ ciency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) in which the
the wage always corresponds to a point on the no-shirking condition.7
In accordance with our identi￿cation assumption that the wage equation is forward-
looking, we exclude from xt any variables that are known at time t￿2: Rational expecta-
tions then imply that we can use all those variables as instruments. In an over-identi￿ed
model, the validity of this assumption is testable using the Hansen test and a test of
residual autocorrelation. Thus, the regressors xt in (32) include no more than the ￿rst
lag of the variables that appear in (33). Our choice of other regressors satis￿es the ￿payo⁄
relevance￿criterion that, in a forward-looking model, wages in the long run should be
determined by only those variables that a⁄ect the payo⁄s of the two parties from a wage
agreement and their payo⁄s in the case of failure to reach an agreement. For the ￿rm,
those payo⁄s are ￿t and ￿ ￿t given by (7) and (8). For the worker, the relevant payo⁄s are
6The formulation in (18) allowed us to incorporate a disutility of working that is not avoided by
shirking (and thus not captured by c) in the form of a constant added to bt=pt. Our estimates of this
constant were not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, so we do not include it in the exposition.
7This conclusion does not depend on the assumption that the deviations of ct=pt from its long-run
value are iid. Allowing deviations by some ￿nite-order unobserved moving average process, we still ￿nd
evidence that the no-shirking condition cannot bind at all t.
17Wt and ￿ Wt, given by (12) and (13). It follows from inspection of those equations that
mt=vt is the only payo⁄relevant variable in addition to those that appear in (33), namely
￿t;￿t;￿t;bt=pt; ￿t and 1 ￿ mt=ut (= Ut=ut by the de￿nitions (2) and (6)).8 However, pre-
liminary estimation indicated that the coe¢ cient on mt=vt (and on vt=ut if that replaces
mt=vt) is insigni￿cant and that the results do not change signi￿cantly if this variable is
excluded from the model. In a highly non-linear model like this, over-parametrization
causes problems with convergence, in addition to the usual loss in e¢ ciency. Therefore,
we use a parsimonious speci￿cation of f (xt) that contains only those variables that are
signi￿cant and that passes the Hansen and residual autocorrelation tests. The speci￿ca-






























t = 0; (34)
where SRD includes lnbt￿1=pt￿1 and ln￿t￿1 in deviations from their long-run values.
For the UK, SRD also includes ￿lnUt=ut and ￿ln￿t to ensure "w
t is not autocorrelated
beyond lag 1.9
3.5 Conventional log-linear wage equation
In addition to the FLRE wage equation (18), we use a conventional log-linear speci￿cation









Thus yt is the wage share wt=pt in excess of the unemployment bene￿t bt=(pt￿t) before
tax. To avoid imposing the impact of bene￿ts on wages, we also investigate whether
bt=(pt￿t) enters signi￿cantly separately on the right-hand side.
As standard in the literature, we use a partial adjustment model to account for the
short-run dynamics in lnyt. Our choice of potentially relevant regressors is guided by
the literature cited in Section 2.3 and by the ￿payo⁄relevance￿discussed in the previous
section. The variables relevant to the ￿rm￿ s payo⁄(other than the wage share wt=pt that
is being determined) are ￿t;￿t;￿t and mt=vt. The only additional variables that enter the
relevant payo⁄s for the worker (apart from the disutility of e⁄ort ct which is unobserved)
are bt=pt; ￿t and mt=ut. It is, however, conventional to use the unemployment rate
Ut ￿ 1￿jt in wage equations and also to include variables for in￿ ation surprises ￿INFLt
and union density udt. The de￿nitions (2) and (6) imply that mt=ut = 1￿Ut=ut so we can
capture the e⁄ect of changes in mt=ut by changes in Ut=ut. Moreover, matching models
typically measure labour market tightness by the ratio of vacancies to unemployment
corresponding to our vt=ut rather than in terms of the two probabilities of matching
corresponding to mt=vt and mt=ut.10 Since the e⁄ect of labour market tightness on the
8Note that, by (29),  t=pt is constant, and the cost ￿t￿n of creating a vacancy has already been
incurred at the time a vacancy becomes available for matching and so is no longer payo⁄ relevant.
9The coe¢ cients on ￿lnUt=ut and ￿ln￿t are opposite in sign and not signi￿cantly di⁄erent in
magnitude, so this restriction has been imposed in estimation and only one of them is reported.
10The hypothesis that the variables ln(mt=vt) and ln(mt=ut) enter the model with coe¢ cients of equal
magnitude and opposite sign could not be rejected by any test at very high levels of signi￿cance.
18wage is important for the impact of matching frictions on unemployment, we want to
avoid an idiosyncratic formulation inconsistent with the formulation in the matching
literature. So we use, as a reasonable encompassing speci￿cation, the form
lnyt = ￿w lnyt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿w)
￿
e ￿0 + e ￿U lnUt + e ￿u ln
Ut
ut




+ SRD + e "
w
t ; (36)
where the tilde distinguishes the parameters from those of the FLRE wage equation (34),
e "w
t is a structural disturbance that is assumed to be an innovation with respect to past
information and SRD denotes additional terms for short-run dynamics containing the
variables (￿t;￿t;￿t;bt=pt;￿t;￿INFLt, udt) in deviation from their long-run levels, as well
as lags of ￿lnyt. Such terms are included up to the point where e "w
t is serially uncorrelated.
Note that bt=pt and ￿t a⁄ect the long-run wage share because they are included in yt by
the de￿nition (35). The speci￿cation (36) permits lnUt;lnut and lnvt to a⁄ect the long-
run wage share independently while keeping separate the term in lnvt=ut that is typically
used in matching models.
As with the other equations, we pare down the list of candidate regressors to a par-
simonious speci￿cation for system estimation using preliminary single-equation estima-
tion. That analysis indicates that the model should include up to four lags of ￿lnyt
for the US, and two lags of ￿lnyt for the UK. Tests of exclusion restrictions using the
ARSW and KLM tests that are robust to weak instruments establish that the variables
￿t;￿t;￿t;bt=pt;￿INFLt and udt can be excluded from SRD for the US and all these plus
￿t for the UK. Details are available on request.
The regressors lnUt, ln(Ut=ut) and ln(v=u) are highly correlated, causing the coe¢ -
cients e ￿U e ￿u and e ￿v to be imprecisely estimated. In fact, e ￿U is not statistically signi￿cant
when ln(Ut=ut) is in the model, so we set it to zero. Moreover, even in the parsimonious
formulation with all the above restrictions imposed, the coe¢ cient e ￿v is not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero (at over 40% level of signi￿cance). This is corroborated by both the
ARSW and KLM tests that are robust to weak instruments (see Table 7 in Appendix D).
In the ￿nal speci￿cation of the conventional wage equation, we therefore set e ￿v = e ￿U = 0
to arrive at the following parsimonious model
lnyt = ￿w lnyt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿w)
￿




+ SRD + e "
w
t : (37)
Matching frictions then a⁄ect the wage through the variable Ut=ut which equals 1￿mt=ut.
4 Estimation results
System estimates for both countries are reported in Table 1, with conventional standard
errors in parentheses. As a speci￿cation test, we report the Hansen (1982) test of overi-
dentifying restrictions based on system estimates, with p-values in square brackets. The
validity of the over-identifying restrictions is not rejected at over 20% signi￿cance level
for either country. We also performed the Hansen test on the single-equation estimates
for each equation and failed to reject at over 25% level for each of the equations in each
country. Details are available on request. We found no evidence of serial correlation in




t and ~ "w
t beyond what is implied by the model.
Thus the system of model equations seem consistent with the data. The two di⁄erent
wage speci￿cations make remarkably little di⁄erence to the parameter estimates of the
19Table 1: System estimates for alternative speci￿cations
US UK
Speci￿cation (1) (2) (1) (2)
Matching function
log(￿0) -0.94 (0.06) -0.95 (0.05) -1.00 (0.15) -0.97 (0.21)
￿1 0.19 (0.03) 0.17 (0.03) 0.60 (0.05) 0.60 (0.07)
￿2 0.55 (0.02) 0.57 (0.02) 0.23 (0.04) 0.24 (0.05)
￿m 0.72 (0.03) 0.72 (0.03) 0.58 (0.05) 0.67 (0.05)
a￿lnu -0.49 (0.04) -0.48 (0.04) 0.45 (0.11) 0.32 (0.10)
Job-creation equation
￿h 1.97 (0.06) 1.99 (0.06) - -
￿0 - - 1.88 (0.09) 1.91 (0.09)
￿1 - - -33.05 (6.39) -36.52 (5.70)
FLRE wage equation
c=p 0.11 (0.01) - 0.23 (0.003) -
￿0 0.56 (0.18) - 2.90 (0.88) -
￿u 2.11 (0.37) - 15.29 (3.19) -
bb=p -0.44 (0.09) - -3.86 (0.75) -
b￿ 4.28 (0.85) - 2.18 (2.44) -
b￿lnU - - 29.95 (6.32) -
Log-linear wage equation
e ￿0 - -0.91 (0.10) - -0.65 (0.03)
e ￿u - -0.38 (0.10) - -0.51 (0.10)
￿w - 0.90 (0.02) - 0.82 (0.05)
e b￿lny1 - -0.23 (0.09) - -0.31 (0.06)
e b￿lny2 - -0.05 (0.06) - -0.21 (0.09)
e b￿lny3 - -0.15 (0.05) - -
e b￿lny4 - 0.22 (0.06) - -
e b￿ - 0.03 (0.01) - -
Hansen Test 14.19 [0.29] 11.62 [0.48] 12.25 [0.43] 12.70 [0.39]
The model is estimated by Continuously Updated GMM with Newey-West weight
matrix. Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in square brackets. Speci￿cation (1)
uses the FLRE wage equation, speci￿cation (2) the log-linear wage equation. For the
US, n = 3; for the UK, n = 2. Sample for US: 1961Q2 - 2001Q2; for UK: 1981Q1 -
2000Q2. The number of over-identifying restrictions is 12 in all cases.
20matching equation and the job-creation equation, so we do not distinguish between them
in our discussion of those two equations. Note that all of the structural parameters of
interest are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the usual 5% level using t and ARSW and
KLM tests.
In the matching equation, the elasticities ￿1 with respect to the vacancy rate and ￿2
with respect to the job seeking rate are highly signi￿cant for both countries. The former
is higher for the UK than the US, the latter lower. In both cases, matching frictions play
a statistically signi￿cant role. We investigate this formally by testing the hypothesis
H0 : ￿0 = ￿1 = 1;￿2 = 0:
These restrictions imply that m=v = 1 in the long-run so that all vacancies are ￿lled
straightaway, as would be the case if there were no matching frictions and all unem-
ployment was the result of e¢ ciency or high wages. The Wald, ARSW and KLM tests
all reject the above hypothesis at signi￿cance levels of less than 0.1% in both countries.
However, contrary to what is assumed by Hall (2005b), Shimer (2005) and others, the
matching function for the US appears to have decreasing returns to proportional changes
in vt and ut in the long run because the hypothesis ￿1 + ￿2 = 1 is resoundingly rejected
against the alternative ￿1 +￿2 < 1 by all three of the Wald, ARSW and KLM tests. So,
although our estimates are well within the ranges in the literature surveyed by Petron-
golo and Pissarides (2001), we checked the sensitivity of our results to the adjustments
we made to the data and to the estimation methods we used in a number of ways. Specif-
ically, we estimated the matching function using vacancies and unemployment with no
adjustment to allow for unrecorded vacancies and direct job-to-job ￿ ows of employees,
using a time trend rather than an error correction mechanism, and using OLS. In all
these cases, the estimates of the elasticities of matches with respect to both vacancies
and unemployment di⁄ered by less than one percentage point from our system estimates
in Table 1 and the hypothesis of constant returns was resoundingly rejected. For only
one speci￿cation we tried was this not true. That was when we did not scale the data
on separations (calculated using the method suggested by Shimer (2005)) to the same
mean level as the separations measured by JOLTS for the period that the JOLTS data
are available. In that case the sum of the elasticities is close to 1 and the test for constant
returns easily accepted. Since, however, the JOLTS data are widely considered to be the
best indicator of the magnitude of separations for the US, it seems more appropriate to
use estimates based on the scaled data.
In the job creation equation, the coe¢ cient ￿h corresponds to hiring costs that are
incurred each period a vacancy is available for matching, while ￿0 and ￿1 relate to costs of
creating a vacancy incurred over the n periods prior to it becoming available for matching.
The coe¢ cient ￿1 in the job creation cost is negative for the UK, indicating that there
are economies of scale to creating vacancies. We are somewhat sceptical that the data
can actually distinguish between these two types of costs in creating a vacancy. However,
which of the costs is important is not crucial for our purposes.
The most interesting parameter estimate from the FLRE wage equation is that for
c=p. The numbers in the table for this are to be interpreted as the proportion of a
worker￿ s output that is required to deter shirking. If the e¢ ciency wage element in the
model was negligible, they should be close to zero. The point estimates are 0.11 and 0.23
for the US and the UK respectively. Both are highly signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
So the data strongly supports the inclusion of the e¢ ciency wage element in the model
in addition to matching frictions. The parameters ￿0 and ￿u, together with the value of
21c=p, determine the location and slope of the long-run wage share equation. The point
estimates imply that, in terms of Figure 1(b), the wage curve for the US lies below that
for the UK, implying a lower equilibrium wage share for any given level of unemployment,
other things equal. This is re￿ ected in our point estimates of the long-run equilibrium
wage share in the two countries, 0.68 in the US versus 0.77 for the UK. Finally, the
positive value of ￿u indicates that the mark-up of wages over the minimum necessary to
deter shirking is increasing in the unemployment rate, implying that the wage curve in
Figure 1(b) slopes less steeply than the no-shirking condition. Interestingly, the estimated
mark-up f at the long-run equilibrium is 0.23 for the US but only 0.01 for the UK.
In the conventional log-linear wage equation, the adjustment coe¢ cient ￿w is higher
in the US than in the UK, in line with the conventional wisdom discussed by Blanchard
and Katz (1999). The di⁄erence in the estimates of e ￿u implies that the wage equation is
also somewhat steeper in the UK than in the US.
5 Implications for long-run unemployment
It is clear from Table 1 that both matching frictions and e¢ ciency wages are statistically
highly signi￿cant. Less clear is the impact they have on unemployment. An obvious
metric for this is their impact on the long-run unemployment rate. We assess that in
this section. Speci￿cally, we derive point estimates and con￿dence intervals for the long-
run unemployment rate U and its components: the components attributable to matching
frictions, to high wages, and to e¢ ciency wages. We denote these components by Uf;Uhw
and Ueff as illustrated in Figure 1. Estimation and inference on each of these can be
done in the same way as for U.
We use long run to refer to values taken when all shocks are zero and all variables
are either constant or in appropriate constant ratios, indicated without subscripts. The
exogenously determined variables with constant long-run values include the job destruc-
tion rate ￿t; the discount factor ￿t; the labour force growth rate lt, the growth rate of
productivity ￿t ￿ pt=pt￿1; the tax wedge ￿t, and the ￿ ow utility from unemployment as
a proportion of the productivity bt=pt. The constant long-run values of the variables mt;
vt; vc
t; jt; ut and wt=pt are determined endogenously by the model.
Although the long-run parameters ￿;￿;￿, l;￿ and b=p are determined exogenously
to the model, their values are needed to draw inferences on long-run unemployment.
Estimating these jointly with the other parameters gives serious problems of convergence.
Since this makes the resulting con￿dence sets unreliable, we use a two-step procedure. We
￿rst estimate the long-run values of the exogenous variables by their sample averages.11
We then keep these parameters ￿xed at their unrestricted point estimates when doing
inference on long-run unemployment. As a result, our reported con￿dence sets do not
take account of the uncertainty in estimating ￿;￿;￿, l;￿ and b=p. The estimates of those
parameters are reported in Table 2. The numbers are broadly similar across the two
countries, with the notable exception of the job destruction rate 1 ￿ ￿, which is twice as
high in the US as in the UK.
11The variables ￿t and bt=pt appear to be trending in our sample. However, since they are restricted to
lie between 0 and 1, they cannot be trending in the long run. In order to use values that re￿ ect current
economic conditions, we estimate ￿ and b=p using the average of the last 12 quarters in the sample.








5.1 Derivation of long-run unemployment rates
Long-run equilibrium is characterized by the long-run versions of the matching equation
(25), the job creation equation (26) with the empirical forms of the job creation cost (28)
and hiring cost (29), and one of the wage equations (34) or (37). With the FLRE wage
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(1 ￿ U)(1 ￿ ￿=l)
m=v
(43)
u = 1 ￿
￿
l
(1 ￿ U): (44)
The system of equations (38), (39), and (40) or (41), together with the identities (42)
to (44), de￿nes the long-run unemployment rate U implicitly as a function of all the long-
run structural parameters ￿;￿ and either (￿;c=p) or e ￿, and the long-run values of the
exogenous variables ￿￿￿;￿;￿=l and b=p. This corresponds to the intersection of the ￿lled
jobs and wage share curves in Figure 1. We can de￿ne the components of U illustrated
in Figure 1 in an analogous way. Uf is the di⁄erence between U and the unemployment
23Table 3: Estimates and 95% con￿dence bounds for long-run unemployment and its com-
ponents, US
Unemployment rate
Speci￿cation total frictional high wage e¢ ciency wage
FLRE wage eq.
Point estimate 5.9% 1.7% 0.7% 3.5%
Standard error 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
Wald [min, max] [5.6, 6.2] [1.4, 2.1] [0.3, 1.1] [2.6, 4.3]
ARSW [min, max] [4.1, 6.9] [0.3, 2.3] [0.6, 2.8] [2.1, 5.6]
KLM [min, max] [4.1, 6.9] [0.7, 2.1] [0.6, 1.4] [2.4, 5.6]
Log-linear wage eq.
Point estimate 5.8% 2.6% - -
Standard error 0.1% 0.5% - -
Wald [min, max] [5.6, 6.2] [1.7, 3.6] - -
ARSW [min, max] [5.4, 6.4] [0.8, 4.5] - -
KLM [min, max] [5.7, 6.2] [1.5, 3.8] - -
Standard errors are computed using the Delta method. Con￿dence bounds are re-
ported in square brackets. ARSW refers to the Anderson-Rubin-Stock-Wright test,
KLM refers to the Kleibergen test.
rate if m=v were 1. Ueff is the unemployment rate if m=v = 1 and the mark-up of wages
over the minimum necessary to deter shirking, f in (34) or e￿0 (U=u)
￿u in (40), were equal
to 0. Finally, Uhw is given by U ￿ Uf ￿ Ueff. Uhw and Ueff are identi￿ed only with
the FLRE wage equation (40). Denote by g (#) the implicit 4-dimensional function that
maps the parameters of the model # to
￿
U;Uf;Uhw;Ueff￿
. Point estimates of U;Uf;Uhw
and Ueff are obtained simply by evaluating the function g (￿) at the CUE of #:
5.2 Inference on long-run unemployment rates
Point estimates without con￿dence intervals are of limited use. We can construct 95%
con￿dence sets for U;Uf;Uhw and Ueff by inverting a test, for example, by collecting all
the points of U that are not rejected by that test at the 5% level of signi￿cance. One
approach is to derive asymptotic standard errors using the delta method and construct
approximate 95% level con￿dence intervals by the usual two-standard-error bands about
the point estimate, see Appendix B for details. As noted above, however, Wald-based
con￿dence sets are not robust to weak identi￿cation. As a result, con￿dence sets with
nominal 95% coverage rate may contain the true value of the parameter much less often
than 95% (that is, they could be too tight). So we also derive identi￿cation-robust
con￿dence sets by inverting the ARSW and KLM tests, see Appendix B for details.
5.3 Long-run unemployment and its components
Tables 3 and 4 report point estimates, standard errors and three alternative sets of 95%
con￿dence bounds for U; Uf; Uhw and Ueff for the US and the UK respectively. Estimates
are derived using both the FLRE and conventional log-linear speci￿cations of the wage
equation, though only for the former can we identify Uhw and Ueff. The Wald-based
24Table 4: Estimates and 95% con￿dence bounds for long-run unemployment and its com-
ponents, UK
Unemployment rate
Speci￿cation total frictional high wage e¢ ciency wage
FLRE wage eq.
Point Estimate 6.1% 0.11% 0.2% 5.8%
Standard Error 0.2% 0.02% 0.1% 0.2%
Wald [min, max] [5.6, 6.5] [0.07, 0.15] [0.0, 0.4] [5.5, 6.2]
ARSW [min, max] [5.6, 6.8] [0.07, 0.27] [0.04, 1.5] [4.3, 6.4]
KLM [min, max] [5.7, 6.5] [0.09, 0.20] [0.04, 3.2] [1.8, 6.2]
Log-linear wage eq.
Point estimate 7.3% 0.2% - -
Standard error 0.5% 0.04% - -
Wald [min, max] [6.4, 8.2] [0.1, 0.3] - -
ARSW [min, max] [5.9, 9.2] [0.2, 0.3] - -
KLM [min, max] [6.4, 8.3] [0.1, 0.3] - -
Standard errors are computed using the Delta method. Con￿dence bounds are re-
ported in square brackets. ARSW refers to the Anderson-Rubin-Stock-Wright test,
KLM refers to the Kleibergen test.
con￿dence intervals are symmetric about the point estimate by construction; the other
two con￿dence intervals are not. This is standard. Con￿dence intervals derived by
inverting tests (for example, likelihood ratio or score tests) are asymmetric except in
very special cases (for example, when they are numerically equivalent to Wald con￿dence
intervals). So, the asymmetry of the intervals reported here has nothing inherently to
do with their being robust to weak identi￿cation. Despite being less tight than the
Wald con￿dence bounds, the ARSW and KLM con￿dence bounds are su¢ ciently tight
to provide valuable economic information.
For the US, the two di⁄erent speci￿cations of the wage equation result in essentially
identical point estimates (5.9% and 5.8%) for the long-run unemployment rate (see the
￿rst column in Table 3), though the conventional log-linear wage equation gives slightly
tighter con￿dence bounds, at least when computed by methods robust to weak identi￿ca-
tion. These are remarkably close to the sample average unemployment rate of 5.8%. For
the UK, the FLRE wage equation gives a similar point estimate for the long-run unem-
ployment rate (6.1%) as for the US. The conventional log-linear wage equation, however,
gives a higher point estimate of 7.3%. Moreover, only the ARSW con￿dence bounds
include the point estimate for the FLRE wage equation, which gives us less con￿dence
in our estimates of the long-run unemployment rate for the UK than for the US. The
point estimates for both UK wage equations are substantially below the sample average
unemployment rate of 9%, which would however seem implausibly high for the long-run
unemployment rate under current conditions. Over the same sample period as for the US,
the average unemployment rate for the UK was 5.8%, which seems a more plausible level
for the long-run unemployment rate and is remarkably close to that estimated using the
FLRE wage equation. It is reassuring that the model estimates the long-run unemploy-
ment rate under current conditions at a plausible level despite that being substantially
below the sample average.
25The second columns of Tables 3 and 4 give values for the component of the long-run
unemployment rate due to matching frictions, Uf. For the US it is estimated at about
1.7% using the FLRE wage equation (34). For the log-linear wage equation (37) the
e⁄ect, at 2.6%, is rather bigger, though the con￿dence sets all include the point estimate
for the FLRE wage equation. In both cases, it is statistically signi￿cant, although the
con￿dence bounds (particularly the robust con￿dence bounds) indicate that it cannot be
pinned down very precisely. For the UK, the point estimates of the component due to
matching frictions are much smaller, 0.11% with the FLRE wage equation and 0.2% with
the log-linear one. But, with both wage equations, the con￿dence bounds are very tight
so that, despite being small, the point estimates are still signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
The third columns of Tables 3 and 4 give the component of the long-run unemployment
rate due to high wages, Uhw. That can be estimated only with the FLRE wage equation.
The point estimates for the two countries are not greatly di⁄erent (0.7%.for the US and
0.2% for the UK), but the robust ARSW and KLM con￿dence bounds indicate that they
are not very precisely estimated.
The ￿nal columns of Tables 3 and 4 give values for the e¢ ciency wage component of the
long-run unemployment rate, the component remaining when both matching frictions and
high wages are removed. Again, that can be estimated only with the FLRE wage equation.
For the US, the point estimate is a substantial 3.5%, for the UK an even more substantial
5.8%. In both countries, it is larger than the other two components taken together.
Even the widest con￿dence sets indicate that around 2% long-run unemployment can
be attributed to e¢ ciency wages in both countries. For the UK, however, the much
wider con￿dence bounds for the KLM than for the ARSW test for both high wages and
e¢ ciency wages are suggestive of a known spurious decline in power of the KLM test
against alternatives that correspond to points of in￿ ection or local minima of the GMM
objective function, see Kleibergen (2005). In such cases, the ARSW con￿dence bounds
are more informative. But, whatever the reason, the issue arises only with respect to
distinguishing between high wage and e¢ ciency wage unemployment. All three tests
agree that their sum is accurately estimated. It is worth emphasizing that the point
estimates of e¢ ciency wage unemployment reported here all lie within the range of sample
values of the unemployment rate. They are not predictions way outside sample values.
Since our measure of e¢ ciency wage unemployment is the residual after removing
the other components, systematic measurement error in unemployment rates will a⁄ect
it. But the numbers in Tables 3 and 4 are su¢ ciently large that it would seem implau-
sible that systematic measurement error could account for all our measured e¢ ciency
wage unemployment. It is even less plausible that it could be large enough to alter our
conclusion that something more than matching frictions alone is required to account for
long-run unemployment. Table 5 gives estimates and con￿dence bounds for the long-run
unemployment rate in the absence of matching frictions (that is, the di⁄erence between
￿total￿and ￿frictional￿in Tables 3 and 4). Measurement error would have to account
for all that for matching frictions to be the sole source of unemployment. Even allowing
for plausible measurement error, there really does seem to be a need for both matching
frictions and e¢ ciency wages to account for unemployment in both the US and the UK.
The approach used here is only one of the possible ways to measure the impact of
matching frictions and e¢ ciency wages on unemployment. An alternative is to measure
the impact of high wages by the shift from B to E in Figure 1(b) and the impact of
matching frictions by the shift from E to A. That can be done only with the FLRE wage
equation but, for that equation, the numerical di⁄erence turns out to be negligible.




Wage equation FLRE Log-linear FLRE Log-linear
Point Estimate 4.2% 3.2% 6.0% 7.1%
Standard Error 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.5%
Wald [min, max] [3.7, 4.7] [2.2, 4.2] [5.7, 6.4] [6.2, 8.0]
ARSW [min, max] [3.4, 6.6] [1.3, 5.2] [5.5, 6.6] [5.7, 9.1]
KLM [min, max] [3.7, 6.2] [2.2, 4.2] [4.7, 6.3] [6.2, 8.1]
Standard errors are computed using the Delta method. Con￿dence bounds are re-
ported in square brackets. ARSW refers to the Anderson-Rubin-Stock-Wright test,
KLM refers to the Kleibergen test.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have constructed and estimated econometrically for two countries (the
USA and the UK) a model that incorporates both matching frictions and e¢ ciency wages
to deter shirking. The matching friction element is essentially an econometric speci￿cation
of that in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) calibrated recently to US data by Hall (2005b),
Hall (2005a) and Shimer (2005). The model of e¢ ciency wages is essentially that of
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) as extended in MacLeod and Malcomson (1998). The model
is su¢ ciently tightly speci￿ed to enable the estimation to recover the underlying model
parameters. That permits the data to determine the extent to which unemployment is
the result of matching frictions, of e¢ ciency wages, and of high wages (that is, wages
above the minimum level required to deter shirking).
Mindful of the concern there has been in the literature about the identi￿cation of
aggregate time series models of the type used here, we have used empirical methods
that are robust to weak instruments. To our knowledge, this is the largest model to
which these identi￿cation-robust methods have so far been applied. At a methodological
level, the paper demonstrates three things. First, it shows that inference methods robust
to weak instruments can be used e⁄ectively in economic models of the type estimated
here. Second, the rather small di⁄erences we ￿nd between the con￿dence intervals based
on Wald statistics and those based on the robust Anderson-Rubin-Stock-Wright and
Kleibergen statistics suggest that the concerns about identi￿cation in such models have
been somewhat over-played. Third, it demonstrates that the model itself, combining as
it does both matching frictions and e¢ ciency wages, can be used e⁄ectively to recover
the underlying structural parameters.
The main conclusion we draw from the results of the analysis is that both matching
frictions and e¢ ciency wages play a signi￿cant role in enabling the model to ￿t the
data. Using as a metric of their economic magnitude their contributions to the long-run
unemployment rate, we ￿nd that matching frictions have a bigger e⁄ect in the US than
in the UK, where (though small) they are still signi￿cant. In contrast, e¢ ciency wages
have a bigger e⁄ect in the UK than in the US. But in both countries, the contribution
of e¢ ciency wages to long-run unemployment is substantial, with point estimates of
more than half the total. Given the non-prescriptive nature of our speci￿cation of wage
27determination, the results suggest that adding e¢ ciency wages to matching frictions may
be a better way to ￿t the data than simply searching for an alternative wage formulation.
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Now use (45) forwarded one period to substitute for the term in square brackets on the




















































= pt ￿ wt + Et
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Now use (45) forwarded two periods to again substitute for the term in square brackets
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or, since ￿t￿t+1￿t+1￿t+2 is known at the time expectations are taken at t+2 and ￿t+2￿t+3
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Since terms in mt=vt; ￿t and ￿t are known when expectations are taken at time t, this

































































32or, since ￿t￿1￿t and mt=vt are known at the time expectations are taken at t,
Et￿n
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This can be re-written
￿ Et￿n
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= 0; 8t: (46)
Recall that











































































where in each case the equality follows because, by (9) and (47), the product of the
expectations is zero. Obviously zt;z0
t and z00
t belong to the t-dated information set, so





















































and, with the use of (9), (46) can be written
￿ Et￿n
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34or, noting which expressions can be moved inside expectations,
￿ Et￿n
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￿￿ ￿t+1￿t￿t+1 ￿ ￿t
￿￿
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35the intermediate equality following because mt=vt is known at the time expectations are
taken at t and the ￿nal line from (10). This is as speci￿ed in the text.




￿t￿j￿t+1￿j ￿ ￿t￿n = 0; 8t;
so zt = z0
t = z00
t = 0 and, hence from (51), zt;n = 0, as claimed in the text.
Appendix B Inference Methods
The KLM statistic is the quadratic form




￿1=2 fT (#); (52)
where PX = X (X0X)
￿1 X0 for any matrix X and D(#) depends on @fT (#)=@# and
@Vff (#)=@#. This is a score statistic, see Kleibergen (2005, Eq. (16)). The test com-
paring KLM (#) to critical values of the ￿2 (p) distribution is the KLM test, with p the
number of parameters. Another useful test statistic is JKLM (#) = S (#)￿KLM (#), for
S (#) de￿ned in (22). In large samples, this is independent of KLM (#) and distributed
as ￿2 (k ￿ p).
For hypotheses involving subsets or functions of the parameters, generally denoted
by g (#) = 0; the ARSW, KLM and JKLM tests are performed as follows. First, derive
the restricted CUE e # by minimizing S (#) in (22) subject to g (#) = 0: Kleibergen and




is asymptotically bounded by ￿2 (k ￿ p + r); where














by a ￿2 (k ￿ p); and the KLM and JKLM tests are derived
analogously. None of these statistics requires any identi￿cation assumptions on #. If any
element of # happens to be poorly identi￿ed, the resulting con￿dence sets are expected
to be wide, see Kleibergen and Mavroeidis (2007) for further details.
As in Section 5.2, let g (#) be the transformation from the structural parameters # to ￿
U;Uf;Uhw;Ueff￿
. Let ^ G denote the Jacobian of this transformation with respect to #
evaluated at the estimated value ^ #: The asymptotic variance matrix of
￿
U;Uf;Uhw;Ueff￿
can be estimated by ^ G^ V# ^ G0; where ^ V# is a consistent estimate of the variance of ^ #. For any
linear combination of the elements of
￿
U;Uf;Uhw;Ueff￿
, denoted by a four-dimensional
vector e; the asymptotic standard error can be computed as
p
e0 ^ G^ V# ^ G0e. For example,
for the standard error of U we set e = (1;0;0;0)
0. The con￿dence interval of plus/minus
two standard errors about the point estimate is a Wald con￿dence interval.
To determine whether some particular value of U, say U0, is in the ARSW and KLM
con￿dence sets for U involves minimizing the GMM objective function (22) subject to the
restriction that g1 (#) = U0 to derive the restricted estimate e #0. The restricted minimum




; is the ARSW statistic and it is asymptotically bounded
by a ￿2 (k ￿ p + 1) random variable irrespective of whether U (or any other parameter)
is identi￿ed or not, as explained in the previous section. The KLM statistic is then
36computed by the formula (52) evaluated at e #0. It is common for such con￿dence sets
to be disjoint. Because we are interested mainly in the smallest and largest value of U
that is consistent with the data at a given level of signi￿cance, we report here only the
boundaries of each con￿dence set. The precision with which those bounds are computed
can be increased by making the grid of values of U ￿ner. We use the same procedure to
derive one-dimensional con￿dence sets for Uf;Uhw and Ueff:
In implementing the above method of inverting the ARSW and KLM tests, compu-
tational di¢ culties arise because the transformation g from the original parameters # to ￿
U;Uf;Uhw;Ueff￿
is highly non-linear and the model involves a large number of unknown
parameters. (To our knowledge, this is the largest model to which these identi￿cation-
robust methods have been applied so far). The most common problem we encountered
was lack of convergence of the restricted CUE estimator. To overcome this di¢ culty with-
out resorting to iterative methods, we used a mixture of numerical optimization and grid
search methods. The procedure is as follows. Instead of considering a one-dimensional
grid of points for the parameter of interest, say U between 0 and 10%, we considered a
four-dimensional grid for the vector
￿
U;Uf;Uhw;Ueff￿
, subject to the admissibility re-









in the grid, we computed the restricted










based method. Since the number of unrestricted parameters is smaller than before, the
CUE converged much more readily. Then, to ￿nd the minimum of the objective func-
tion subject to a single restriction, say U = U0; we used grid search over the remaining
three parameters Uf;Uhw;Ueff. Because this procedure involves grid search in four di-
mensions, it is computationally expensive when a high degree of precision is required. In
order to increase the precision we took a two-step approach. We ￿rst set a relatively large
grid step (0.5%) to identify the region of the parameter space that is clearly inconsistent
with the data. Then, we re￿ned our grid search focusing on the remaining region of the
parameters using a smaller grid step.
Appendix C Data
To satisfy identities in the employment data, account must be taken of the self-employed.
We treat them as an exogenously varying proportion of the labour force. Government jobs
provide matches and so need to be to be taken account of in the matching function. But
these cannot reasonably be expected to be determined by the pro￿t criteria underlying the
job creation equation (10), so we treat them as exogenously determined. To be consistent
with that, the productivity and wage measures are constructed from National Accounts
data for the business sector only.
The tax measures and bene￿t replacement ratios are based on OECD data (National
Accounts, Main Economic Indicators, International Financial Statistics) and ILO data
(Yearbook). We obtained this data directly from Jakob Madsen, who describes their
construction in Madsen (1998). Tax and bene￿t data are available only at an annual
frequency. Since bene￿ts and taxes are adjusted on an infrequent basis, interpolation
seems inappropriate, so each data point has simply been used for four quarters.
Vacancy data for the UK is obtained from O¢ ce for National Statistics: Labour
Market Trends (vacancy creation: ￿Un￿lled vacancies at UK Job centres￿ ; vacancy stock:
￿In￿ ow of vacancies at UK job centres￿ ). The data used to construct series for job
37Table 6: Preliminary tests on the job creation equation
US UK
Speci￿cation (0) (1) (2) (0) (1) (2)
Parameters
￿0 -0.19 (0.17) - 0.50 (0.03) 1.12 (0.71) - 1.87 (0.10)
￿1 -1.49 (2.46) - 2.15 (1.02) -39.7 (11.8) - -34.6 (6.9)
￿h 2.76 (0.57) 1.95 (0.07) - 2.16 (2.07) 3.90 (0.13) -
Tests
Wald - 2.32 [0.31] 23.48 [0.00] - 20.96 [0.00] 1.09 [0.30]
ARSW - 8.02 [0.24] 124.27 [0.00] - 16.92 [0.01] 3.71 [0.59]
KLM - 2.44 [0.30] 103.51 [0.00] - 5.86 [0.05] 1.12 [0.29]
Diagnostics
Hansen ￿2(5) 5.09 [0.28] 8.02 [0.24] 124.27 [0.00] 2.21 [0.70] 16.92 [0.01] 3.71 [0.59]
Ser Corr ￿2(5) 4.48 [0.48] 4.39 [0.49] 4.76 [0.45] 1.58 [0.90] 1.66 [0.89] 1.63 [0.90]
Instruments include lags of w=p; ~ ￿ and vc. CUE-GMM with Newey-West weight
matrix. Sample for US: 1961 (2) - 2001 (2); for UK: 1981 (1) - 2000 (2).
Diagnostics: Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions; Cumby and Huizinga
(1992) test of residual autocorrelation from lags 2n to 2n + 4.
destruction for the US, the number of unemployed with spells shorter than 14 months,
are from the Current Population Survey.
Appendix D Preliminary estimation and tests
Table 6 presents single-equation estimates of the job-creation equation for the US and
the UK. The structural parameters ￿0;￿1 and ￿h are not accurately estimated in the
unrestricted speci￿cation, column (0) in Table 6. In both countries, the standard errors
of the estimated coe¢ cients are large and, in the US, job creation costs are estimated to
be slightly negative. Therefore, we consider two alternative speci￿cations in which we set
to zero either the job creation costs (speci￿cation 1) or the job hiring costs (speci￿cation
2). We perform the Wald, ARSW and KLM tests of these two speci￿cations against the
unrestricted model for each country, and we ￿nd that ￿h is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero in the US but not in the UK, and conversely, ￿0;￿1 are di⁄erent from zero in the UK
but not in the US. We impose those restrictions thereafter.
Also reported in Table 6 are two speci￿cation tests. The Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions is standard for models estimated by GMM. (The test statistic is equal to the
value of the objective function (22) evaluated at the CUE ^ #.) This tests the identifying
assumption made when we set the right-hand side of equation (10) to zero. For both the
unrestricted speci￿cations and the chosen restricted speci￿cations (speci￿cation 1 for the
US and speci￿cation 2 for the UK), the Hansen test does not reject the validity of our
over-identifying assumption at over 20% level of signi￿cance. This conclusion is robust
to increasing the instrument set. The tests of residual autocorrelation reported here are
those proposed by Cumby and Huizinga (1992), using the West (1997) estimator of the
weighting matrix, see Mavroeidis (2002).
38Table 7: Preliminary estimation and tests on the wage equation
US UK
Speci￿cation (0) (1) (2) (0) (1) (2)
Parameters
e ￿0 -0.91 (0.24) -0.93 (0.21) -0.87 (0.08) -0.58 (0.35) -0.58 (0.34) -0.69 (0.05)
e ￿u -0.99 (0.97) -0.39 (0.20) -0.33 (0.08) -0.39 (0.83) -0.48 (0.46) -0.62 (0.16)
e ￿v -0.08 (0.19) -0.05 (0.16) - 0.08 (0.23) 0.06 (0.19) -
e ￿U 0.21 (0.33) - - -0.02 (0.14) - -
￿w 0.89 (0.04) 0.87 (0.03) 0.88 (0.03) 0.89 (0.05) 0.89 (0.05) 0.88 (0.04)
e b￿lny1 -0.23 (0.11) -0.20 (0.10) -0.21 (0.10) -0.18 (0.09) -0.18 (0.08) -0.18 (0.08)
e b￿lny2 -0.05 (0.07) -0.03 (0.07) -0.04 (0.06) -0.25 (0.10) -0.25 (0.10) -0.26 (0.10)
e b￿lny3 -0.15 (0.06) -0.14 (0.05) -0.15 (0.05) - - -
e b￿lny4 0.19 (0.07) 0.19 (0.07) 0.19 (0.07) - - -
e b￿ 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) - - -
Tests
Wald - 0.41 [0.52] 0.52 [0.77] - 0.02 [0.90] 0.12 [0.94]
ARSW - 1.84 [0.87] 1.93 [0.93] - 9.48 [0.22] 9.61 [0.29]
KLM - 0.53 [0.47] 0.62 [0.73] - 0.02 [0.88] 0.17 [0.92]
Diagnostics
Hansen 1.27 [0.87] 1.84 [0.87] 1.93 [0.93] 9.46 [0.15] 9.48 [0.22] 9.61 [0.29]
Ser. Corr. 4.11 [0.53] 5.00 [0.42] 5.11 [0.40] 8.58 [0.13] 8.59 [0.13] 7.16 [0.21]
The dependent variable is y = log(w=p ￿ b=p=￿). Instruments include lags of y,
log(U=u), log(v=u), log(U) and log￿. CUE-GMM with Newey-West weight matrix.
Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in square brackets. Tests of speci￿cations
(1) and (2) against nesting model (0). Sample for US: 1961 (2) - 2001 (2); for UK:
1981 (1) - 2000 (2).
Diagnostics: Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions; Cumby and Huizinga
(1992) test of residual autocorrelation from lags 1 to 5.
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